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Referendum: Discrepancies Between
Two Exit Polls and Official Results
Raquel Prado and Bruno Sanso´
Abstract. We present a simulation-based study in which the results
of two major exit polls conducted during the recall referendum that
took place in Venezuela on August 15, 2004, are compared to the of-
ficial results of the Venezuelan National Electoral Council “Consejo
Nacional Electoral” (CNE). The two exit polls considered here were
conducted independently by Su´mate, a nongovernmental organization,
and Primero Justicia, a political party. We find significant discrepan-
cies between the exit poll data and the official CNE results in about
60% of the voting centers that were sampled in these polls. We show
that discrepancies between exit polls and official results are not due
to a biased selection of the voting centers or to problems related to
the size of the samples taken at each center. We found discrepancies in
all the states where the polls were conducted. We do not have enough
information on the exit poll data to determine whether the observed
discrepancies are the consequence of systematic biases in the selection
of the people interviewed by the pollsters around the country. Neither
do we have information to study the possibility of a high number of
false or nonrespondents. We have limited data suggesting that the dis-
crepancies are not due to a drastic change in the voting patterns that
occurred after the exit polls were conducted. We notice that the two
exit polls were done independently and had few centers in common, yet
their overall results were very similar.
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1. INTRODUCTION
A presidential recall referendum (RR) took place
in Venezuela on August 15, 2004. A tense political
debate preceded the RR, the main issue being the
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timing and the validity of the process that led to
the RR actually taking place. The Organization of
American States (OAS) sent a delegation chaired by
its Secretary General to negotiate a solution. The
Carter Center, led by President Jimmy Carter him-
self, played an important role in getting the govern-
ment and the opposition to agree on a course of ac-
tion. The Consejo Nacional Electoral (CNE) was the
official body in charge of the organization of the RR.
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reprint differs from the original in pagination and
typographic detail.
1
2 R. PRADO AND B. SANSO´
Table 1
Official results of the 2004 Venezuelan recall referendum
Number votes % of votes
Registered voters 14,037,900 100%
Casted votes 9,815,631 69.92%
Number votes % of casted votes
Yes votes 3,989,008 40.64%
No votes 5,800,629 59.10%
Invalid votes 25,994 0.26%
Since the RR was seen by all parties involved as
a pivotal event, several organizations set up schemes
to collect exit poll data. In this work we study data
from two exit polls collected independently by Su´-
mate, a Venezuelan nongovernmental organization
(NGO) and Primero Justicia, a Venezuelan political
party. Su´mate (http://sumate.org/index.html)
defines its mission as that of “building democracy.”
It played a leading role in the process of collecting
the signatures needed to call the RR. Primero Justi-
cia (http://www.primerojusticia.org.ve) is a rel-
atively young party that campaigned actively to re-
call the President. The exit poll samples were col-
lected during the day when the RR took place, at
a number of voting centers around the country. As
seen in Table 1, the official results of the recall (avail-
able from www.cne.gov.ve) were 40.6% in favor of
recalling the president (Yes vote) and 59.1% against
recalling the president (No vote). There was a per-
centage of 0.3% of invalid votes. These results are in
sharp contrast with the exit poll results. According
to Su´mate, the percentage of Yes votes was 60.7%
and according to Primero Justicia, the percentage
of Yes votes was 60.5%.
The large observed discrepancies between these
exit polls and the actual official results immediately
triggered discussions among experts and nonexperts
in Venezuela questioning the validity of the polls
and the official results. One of the arguments raised
against the exit polls was that the selection of the
polled centers was biased. Another was that exit
polls were conducted only until early in the after-
noon, while many of the voting centers stayed open
until late at night. Yet another argument was that
the exit polls were biasedly conducted by interview-
ers who were prone to choose pro-Yes voters and
that No-voters were less inclined to respond to these
polls.
Hausmann and Rigobo´n (2004) present a compre-
hensive discussion of several issues regarding the
possibility of fraud in the recall referendum. Other
related references include Delfino and Salas (2011)
and Taylor (2007). In particular, for the Su´mate and
Primero Justicia exit polls, Hausmann and Rigobo´n
show that there are no significant differences be-
tween the official results for the centers in those
polls and the official results for the overall popula-
tion, thus indicating that the selection of the polled
centers was not particularly biased.
In this study we find significant discrepancies be-
tween the Su´mate and PJ exit poll results and the
official results for the majority of the voting cen-
ters. We also find (via a simulation study) that the
discrepancies are neither due to chance nor to the
exit polls taking too small a sample for each center.
While most of the centers in the exit polls were op-
erated with voting machines, some manual centers
were also sampled. We consider this small subgroup
separately, since the analysis in these cases is compli-
cated by the presence of invalid votes. Invalid votes
are virtually nonexistent for the automatic centers.
Su´mate has produced a report on the entire refe-
rendum process (Su´mate, 2004), which is available
from their web page. The Carter Center has produ-
ced two reports, one on the audit of the RR results
(The Carter Center, 2004) and a final report about
observing the RR process (The Carter Center, 2005).
Both reports are available at www.cartercenter.org.
The exit poll data analyzed here were provided
by Su´mate. The data are available from Su´mate
upon request. The official data on the recall referen-
dum were obtained from the official CNE web site
www.cne.gov.ve.
2. EXIT POLL DATA
2.1 Su´mate Exit Poll
The exit poll conducted by Su´mate consisted of
a sample of 269 voting centers, out of 8279 total
centers. These were located in 23 of the 24 states
and federal entities. The exception being the State
of Delta Amacuro. Only one center was polled in
each of the states of Cojedes and Amazonas. In all
other states at least two centers were polled. Vot-
ing centers in Venezuelan embassies and consulates
were not included in the polling. A total of 23,827
people were interviewed in these centers. This corre-
sponds to a population of 945,074 voters registered
in such polled centers. The exit poll was designed
by Su´mate and the American polling firm Penn,
Schoen and Berland Associates (PSB). According
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Table 2
Example of hourly reporting form for the Su´mate exit poll
corresponding to the time 7:00–8:00 am
Age
<30 30–50 >50
Gender Target Polled Target Polled Target Polled
Male 1 2 1
Female 2 2 1
Total 3 4 2
to Su´mate, the pollsters were volunteers who were
trained and supervised by Su´mate and PSB for more
than a month. They were instructed to follow a pro-
tocol to guarantee that the sample had the least pos-
sible bias. In particular, strong emphasis was given
to the fact that the pollsters should not be iden-
tified as members of Su´mate or any other politi-
cal group. Samples were collected by asking selected
people coming out of the voting center to deposit an
envelop with their voting option in a closed ballot
box. This was the only question asked, no additional
information about the person interviewed (e.g., age,
sex, income, etc.) was recorded and linked to his or
hers voting option. People were selected to reflect
the proportion of gender and age distribution in the
center. Each center had a target sample size per hour
for each gender and for each one of three age groups.
A sample of an hourly reporting form is presented
in Table 2. Pollsters were instructed to avoid inter-
viewing more than one person from a given cluster of
people. Ballots from all the voters interviewed were
deposited in the same box and results were reported
to a supervisor every two hours.
The sampling scheme was designed to collect data
from the chosen voting centers between 7:00 am and
5:00 pm, since the Venezuelan electoral law states
that voting centers have to be opened at 7:00 am
and should close by 4:00 pm, but should remain
open as long as there are voters in line. The vot-
ing process was extremely slow due to a historically
large attendance of the voters and the introduction
of new voting technology, such as fingerprint read-
ers and automatic voting machines. Because of this,
the CNE extended the closing hour of the voting
centers twice during the afternoon of the RR day,
first indicating that centers had to remain open un-
til 9 pm and then extending the closing time until
12:00 pm (see the reports of the Carter Center and
Su´mate for a summary of some of the facts related
to the procedures that need to be followed during
election day and the actual RR process). For this
reason, only 24 out of the 269 centers chosen to be
polled by Su´mate were polled until 11:00 pm.
We have access to a database where the samples
are recorded every two hours, as they were reported
by the pollsters. We observed that the data collec-
tion process was, for most centers, very regular. We
were able to calculate the overall target for each
center and compare that to the effectively observed
sample. This is important to establish if a center was
strongly above or below target. We notice that be-
ing below target does not provide useful information
about the nonresponse. Indeed, there could be many
factors affecting the fact that a pollster collected less
samples than planned.
2.2 Primero Justicia Exit Poll
The exit poll conducted by Primero Justicia (PJ)
consisted of a sample of 258 voting centers located
in 21 of the 24 Venezuelan states and federal en-
tities. The three states excluded from the sample
were Amazonas, Cojedes and Delta Amacuro. No
embassies or consulates were included in the sam-
ple. A total of 12,347 people were interviewed. This
corresponds to a population of 1,151,980 voters reg-
istered in the polled centers. The protocol that the
interviewers followed to collect the sample was sim-
ilar to that used by Su´mate. Samples were collected
from 7:00 am to 3:00 pm. There was a target num-
ber of samples to be obtained per hour. Reports were
sent to a central office six times during the day. In-
terviewers worked in pairs and were given specific
instructions on the way to perform the interview so
that minimum bias would result. The PJ poll set tar-
gets for the number of interviews that were smaller
than the ones set by Su´mate and sampled only up
to 3:00 pm. This produced a total sample size of
roughly a half of that of Su´mate. For this exit poll
we only have the total number of samples taken dur-
ing the day.
3. DATA ANALYSIS
In this analysis we only consider centers for which
more than 20 samples were collected in either of the
two exit polls. In addition, we exclude centers from
the Su´mate exit poll for which the number of people
interviewed was 50% smaller or 20% higher than the
target sample size. We exclude the centers that were
strongly above their targets since this is taken as
an indication that the interviewer was in violation
of the protocol. In particular, there could be many
unsolicited answers that could bias the sample. We
were left with data for a total of 497 centers. From
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these 497 centers, 464 were automatic and 33 were
manual. The Su´mate and PJ polls have 27 common
centers, all of them automatic.
A comparison of the results obtained by the two
exit polls in the common centers shows that in 19
out of the 27 cases the exit polls produce compat-
ible results. Figure 1 gives a graphical comparison
Fig. 1. Comparison of the common exit polls. The results
from the Su´mate exit poll (indicated by +) and the PJ exit
poll (indicated by ×) are shown. Centers in which the two
polls differ significantly are highlighted in the bottom margin.
Significance is established at the 1% level. Numbers in the x
axis correspond to the CNE coding of the centers.
of the samples. The significance is established using
a z test at the 1% level (for details about the z test
see, for example, DeGroot and Schervish, 2002). We
closely inspected the data of the 8 centers where the
two exit polls differ significantly. We found that in 2
of these 8 centers there are reasons to believe that
one of the two exit polls might be biased in favor or
against the Yes vote. This may be due to problems
related to either a small sample size or a biased se-
lection of the people interviewed. The official recall
results are compatible with at least one of the two
exit polls, usually the one from Su´mate, in 7 of these
8 centers.
The availability of data reported every two hours
for the Su´mate exit polls provides information about
possible trends in the voting pattern during the day.
The left panel in Figure 2 shows the proportion of
Yes votes per state at the five reporting times for
all the states that were polled. We see no obvious
pattern for the state data. We do observe a slight
increasing pattern for the overall proportion of Yes
votes, as suggested by the thick black line that cor-
responds to the mean. The right panel shows the
proportion of Yes votes for the centers that were
sampled until 11 pm. Again, we observe no obvious
pattern or trend here except for a slight increase in
the overall proportion of Yes votes during morning
hours.
In order to determine if the automatic and manual
centers exhibited a different behavior, we analyzed
the data from these two classes of centers separately.
Fig. 2. Proportion of Yes votes at reporting times for the Su´mate exit poll: proportions for the states (left panel), proportions
for the centers that were polled until 23:00 (right panel).
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Fig. 3. Distribution of Yes vote proportions by center: official results (top panel), exit poll results (bottom panel).
3.1 Automatic Centers
We begin by comparing the distribution of the
proportion of Yes votes obtained in the exit polls
per center and the distribution of the official pro-
portion of Yes votes obtained in the polled centers.
Figure 3, top panel, displays a histogram of the pro-
portions of Yes votes reported by the CNE in the
464 automatic polled centers. The bottom panel of
Figure 3 shows a histogram of the proportions of
Yes votes reported by the exit polls in the same 464
automatic centers. It can be seen from these pic-
tures that the distribution of the final referendum
recall results and the distribution of the exit poll re-
sults differ sharply. Figure 3 gives a clear indication
that the differences between the results of the exit
polls and the official ones are not due to a biased
choice of the centers. In fact, for the same centers,
we obtain two completely different distributions of
Yes votes.
In order to obtain a more specific quantification
of the differences between the results for a given
center, we calculated the likelihood of observing the
samples obtained by the exit polls for such center
as follows. Let yj be the number of Yes votes ob-
served by the pollster for a given center j and let tj
be the size of the sample collected at center j by
the pollster. So, for example, for center j = 1 (with
CNE ID number 400), located in the Capital Dis-
trict, Municipio Libertador, we have that y1 = 68
and t1 = 120. The proportion of Yes votes in the exit
poll for this center is then y1/t1 = 0.57. The actual
proportion for this center as reported by the CNE is
PY,1 = 992/2270 = 0.44. How likely is it that a sam-
ple of 68 Yes votes would be observed in a sample
of 120 voters where each voter has probability 44%
of voting yes?
We answer the question by assuming that yj is
a random sample from a binomial distribution. Sup-
pose that the true probability of a Yes vote for cen-
ter j is equal to the official proportion of Yes votes
for such center, say, PY,j . Then
yj ∼ Bin(tj, PY,j).(1)
Using (1), we obtain that the required probability is
Pr(y1 = 68) = 0.0015. Clearly, this probability could
be small just because y1 could take 121 possible val-
ues. So we compute Pr(y1 ≥ 68) = 0.0035. We then
repeat this calculation for all the automatic centers.
Figure 4 displays a histogram of the probabilities
for all the centers. We observe that about 70% of
these probabilities lie in the interval (0,0.013). That
is, about 70% of the polled centers’ results have
a chance smaller than 1.3% of being obtained from
a population where the proportions of Yes votes
were the official proportions.
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Fig. 4. Histogram of the probabilities of obtaining the sam-
ples observed in the exit polls using the official results as the
probabilities of a Yes vote.
3.2 Further Analyses
To obtain a better idea of how different the official
and the exit polls results are, we performed a simu-
lation study. Specifically, we simulated 5000 samples
of the same size as those of the exit polls, for each
center. In these simulations we set the probability
of a Yes vote for each center at the official propor-
tion of a Yes vote at that center, denoted PY,j . In
other words, we simulated 5000 samples from (1),
for j = 1, . . . ,464. We then computed the 0.05 and
99.5 quantiles (to produce a 99% interval) of the
proportions of Yes votes in the 5000 samples, and
compared the proportions observed in the exit polls
to such intervals. A graphical representation of the
results can be seen in Figures 5 and 6 for 4 of the
21 polled states with more than one center. In these
figures, a center where the exit poll proportion falls
outside the 99% interval is marked with a square.
Such a case is labeled as a discrepancy. We report
the percentage of those per state. As an example, in
the State of Miranda the intervals did not cover the
exit poll results in 70% of the centers.
Zulia, Miranda and the Capital District are the
three most populated states in Venezuela, with ap-
proximately 32% of the total population. Vargas is
a comparatively small state that is considered as
a stronghold of the government. We observe that in
about 60% of the centers the exit poll result falls
above the upper limit of the interval. This happens
even when the exit poll predicted that the No vote
would win in a given State, as is the case of Var-
gas (see bottom panel in Figure 5). In addition, this
is not a peculiar behavior observed only in certain
regions in the country, as can be seen from the re-
sults in Table 3. We observe substantial variability
in both the location and the width of the intervals
for centers in some of the states. Differences in width
are not surprising, as exit poll sample sizes were not
uniform. For example, centers 420 and 690, both
in Dtto. Capital, had 21 and 100 polls collected, re-
spectively. The number of registered voters was 2909
for center 420 and 5021 for center 690. Addition-
ally, urban regions in Venezuela can have pockets of
relatively affluent areas surrounded by very low in-
come areas. So we can expect very different voting
patterns even in centers that are located nearby. In
other words, both tj and PY,j may vary substantially
within a given state. These issues partly explain the
disparate distribution of the intervals in the figures.
3.3 Manual Centers
We performed a separate analysis of the data cor-
responding to the manual centers for two reasons.
The first one is that the manual data have invalid
votes. These are almost non existent in the auto-
matic centers. This implies that the variable cor-
responding to a vote in a manual center has three
possible outcomes. The second reason is that man-
ual centers are peculiar. They usually correspond to
remote locations and they have a much smaller num-
ber of voters than the automatic ones. Table 4 shows
the detailed numbers for some of the manual centers.
We can see that most of them had only a few hun-
dred voters. This is typical for the 33 manual centers
that were included in the exit poll samples.
The percentages of invalid votes in the 33 manual
centers considered here go from 0% to 13.5%, with
an average of 3.5%. In order to take the invalid votes
into account, we do the following calculation. We as-
sume that the number of Yes, No and invalid votes
in a sample of size tj taken from center j, where the
proportions of Yes votes, No votes and invalid votes
are, PY,j, PN,j and PI,j , respectively, follow a multi-
nomial distribution. This is
(yj, nj, ij)∼Mult(tj ; (PY,j , PN,j, PI,j)).(2)
We assume that the proportions of the Yes, No and
invalid votes, PY,j, PN,j and PI,j , are the actual pro-
portions obtained in the recall referendum for each
center j. We also assume that the sample size tj is
the same as that taken by the pollsters at the center.
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Fig. 5. 99% probability intervals for the proportions of Yes votes computed using 5000 simulated samples for each automatic
center. The simulated samples were of the same size as the samples in the exit polls. The probability of a Yes vote was taken
as the official one. The dotted lines indicate the intervals. The exit poll results are marked with squares when they fall outside
the corresponding intervals.
Now, for each center j, we generate 5000 sam-
ples from (2). We then take the proportion of Yes
votes for each one of the 5000 samples as (yj+ij)/tj ,
and use these values to compute the 99% intervals
that will be compared against the proportion of Yes
votes observed by the pollsters. In doing this, we
account for the fact that the pollsters could have
interviewed people whose votes resulted in being in-
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Fig. 6. 99% intervals for the proportions of Yes votes computed using 5000 simulated samples for each automatic center.
The simulated samples were of the same size as the samples in the exit polls. The probability of a Yes vote was taken as the
official one. The dotted lines denote the intervals. The exit poll results are marked with squares when they fall outside the
corresponding intervals.
valid. Note that we are assuming an extreme sit-
uation here in which all the invalid vote samples
are actually counted as Yes votes. Figure 7 shows
a graphical representation of the results. We find
that the exit poll results of 19 out of the 33 manual
centers considered present significant discrepancies
with the official results. In one of these 19 centers
the discrepancy occurred as a result of overestimat-
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Table 3
Percentage of centers in the exit polls, for states with more than one polled center, that have significant discrepancies with
the official results
State Discrepancies State Discrepancies State Discrepancies
Capital 54% Anzoa´tegui 71% Apure 100%
Aragua 66% Barinas 67% Bol´ıvar 52%
Carabobo 58% Falco´n 25% Gua´rico 64%
Lara 60% Me´rida 36% Miranda 70%
Monagas 53% Nva. Esparta 80% Portuguesa 62%
Sucre 67% Ta´chira 68% Trujillo 54%
Vargas 57% Yaracuy 70% Zulia 53%
ing the Yes vote due to all the invalid votes in the
simulation being counted as Yes votes.
Table 4 gives some interesting insight on the data
for the manual centers where we found large dis-
crepancies. In general, we observe that the sizes of
the exit poll samples are fairly large, relative to
the number of voters. So, assuming that the official
results correspond to the true probabilities of Yes
votes, obtaining such large differences is only possi-
ble if the exit poll samples were extremely biased.
We marked with (∗) four centers that we found par-
ticularly intriguing. For centers 5450, 16,870, 43,140
and 44,200, the exit polls collected samples of 38%,
26%, 30% and 23% of all voters. Of the total Yes
votes, 82%, 65%, 82% and 67% ended up in the exit
poll samples, respectively. If the very low propor-
tions of Yes votes officially reported are correct, the
interviewers did not follow the protocol and were
able to bias the sample.
4. DISCUSSION
The previous analyses involve no sophisticated sta-
tistical modeling. They are based on the assumption
that the official CNE results are true. They provide
an exploration of the likelihood that samples like
those in the exit polls would be obtained under such
Table 4
Exit poll and official results for the manual centers in which significant discrepancies were found. The columns correspond to
the Center ID, the number of Yes and No votes in the exit poll, the proportion of Yes votes in the exit poll pY,i, the number
of official No, Yes and invalid votes (I), the proportion of Yes votes in the official results PY,i, the closing time (CT) of the
exit poll at the center and the closing time of the voting center
ID Yes No pY,j Yes No I PY,j CT CT
exit poll exit poll CNE CNE exit poll
5450 63 11 0.85 77 117 2 0.39 3:00 pm (∗) 6:30 pm
13,160 49 35 0.58 268 466 66 0.34 3:00 pm 8:00 pm
14,041 44 36 0.55 160 820 10 0.16 3:00 pm NA
16,870 42 46 0.48 65 265 12 0.19 5:00 pm (∗) 5:10 pm
17,480 56 42 0.57 183 255 0 0.42 5:00 pm 9:30 pm
21,311 50 44 0.53 194 425 42 0.29 5:00 pm 8:30 pm
21,630 55 29 0.65 189 199 10 0.47 3:00 pm 8:30 pm
31,723 53 27 0.66 217 359 18 0.37 3:00 pm 9:00 pm
34,610 67 35 0.66 361 538 28 0.39 5:00 pm 9:07 pm
43,140 37 21 0.64 45 152 0 0.23 3:00 pm (∗) NA
44,200 36 58 0.38 54 264 8 0.17 5:00 pm (∗) NA
47,550 63 27 0.70 346 668 0 0.34 3:00 pm 2:00 am
48,490 58 23 0.72 130 277 2 0.32 3:00 pm 7:41 pm
60,290 65 29 0.69 345 746 44 0.30 5:00 pm 7:00 pm
11,895 34 26 0.57 155 1678 40 0.08 3:00 pm NA
15,680 39 21 0.65 265 410 30 0.38 3:00 pm NA
29,330 15 15 0.50 42 772 48 0.05 3:00 pm NA
42,808 28 14 0.67 231 464 52 0.31 3:00 pm NA
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Fig. 7. 99% probability intervals for the proportions of Yes votes computed using 5000 simulated samples for each manual
center. The simulated samples were of the same size as the samples in the exit polls. The probability of a Yes vote for a given
center is taken as the official proportion of a Yes vote in such center. The dotted lines denote the intervals. Exit poll results
are marked with squares when they fall outside the intervals.
assumption. The conclusion is that, for a large num-
ber of centers, observing samples like the ones in the
exit polls is a very unlikely event, given the official
CNE results. So, clearly, the differences between the
predictions of the exit polls and the actual results
at the national level are not due to a bias in the
selection of the centers. There are significant differ-
ences between the official results and the exit polls in
about 60% of the centers that are not due to chance.
Centers where differences are present are located in
all states, so there does not seem to be any clear
geographical bias in effect in the exit polls.
Clearly, the differences between the exit polls and
the official results could be due to a strong bias in
favor of the Yes votes. Such bias would be the ef-
fect of the way samples were collected. To explain
the differences between exit polls and official results,
the bias should be present not just in a few centers,
but in about 60% of them and be geographically
consistent. That is, several hundred pollsters across
the country should have obtained systematically bi-
ased samples that favored the Yes vote, and this in
spite of having been precisely instructed to follow
a protocol to avoid such bias. Given the protocol,
no information about the voters was recorded. So we
have no way to associate covariates like, say, gender,
age, race, religion or social status, to voting patterns
in a way that would reveal systematic biases in the
selection of the sample.
Unfortunately we have no good estimation of the
nonresponse. An explanation of the discrepancies
between the official results and the exit polls could
be that the No voters were less willing to answer
than the Yes voters. Now, suppose that the esti-
mation of Yes vote was about 60% when the true
value was about 40%, as in the official result. This
requires that about 33% of the people interviewed
did not respond and had actually voted No. Again,
this phenomenon should have happened all over the
country.
Similar arguments could be given for the false re-
sponses. In this case, about 33% of the Yes samples
should have corresponded to actual No voters. Such
a high level of false responses should have happened
even though the exit polls refer to just one question
with a binary secret answer. Also, the question is
about a vote that has already been casted, so the
respondent has no doubts. The subjects are easily
identifiable and the process of obtaining the sample
is quick and simple.
Another explanation for the discrepancies of be-
tween exit polls and official results could be that
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there were massive numbers of No votes late in the
evening. We have only very limited data shown in
Figure 2 to study this possibility. These data do not
support such an explanation. On the contrary, the
national average of Yes votes was slightly increasing
over the ten-hour period for which most exit polls
were conducted. We notice that at the time the exit
polls were finalized the proportion of Yes votes was
about 60%. To lower this percentage to 40% by the
end of the evening, the Yes vote proportion should
have plunged to 20% after 5 pm, for the same num-
ber of votes as those casted during he first ten hours
of the voting day.
After the RR, two audits of the automated counts
were done by the CNE. According to the Su´mate
report, the first one, known as the “hot” audit, was
carried out at the time of the closing of the centers
in only 84 of 199 preselected centers. Such an au-
dit is also mentioned in the Carter Center’s report.
We were unable to find any data related to the re-
sult of the hot audit. The second audit took place
three days after the RR and the opposition parties
declined to participate, claiming it was flawed. Two
hundred centers were sampled and some of the bal-
lot boxes from 150 of those centers audited. Unfortu-
nately, the information regarding which centers were
effectively audited has not been made available by
either the CNE or the Carter Center, who witnessed
the audit. Of the 200 centers in the original list, 15
were among those polled by Su´mate and 14, differ-
ent ones, among those polled by PJ. Unfortunately
it has not been possible to establish if any of these
29 centers were among the list of 150 audited ones.
The exit polls analyzed in this paper are not the
only ones that were conducted for the RR. We ob-
tained the data of an exit poll conducted by Proyecto
Venezuela, another political party that campaigned
actively to recall the President, based on more than
200,000 voters sampled between 6:30 am and 2 pm.
The results are in line with those of the two exit
polls considered in this work. We decided not to in-
clude an analysis of those data here due to the fact
that we were unable to find a good description of
the protocol followed by the pollsters. The Carter
Center report mentions an exit poll conducted by
the American firm Evans/McDonough that had the
No vote winning with 55% (see also Collier, 2004).
We were unable to find information about this poll.
The web page of the company has a link to a doc-
ument containing results from a polling previous
to the RR (www.evansmcdonough.com/venezuela/
VenezuelanPollPre.pdf) but no mention of an exit
poll.
We emphasize that this study does not provide
conclusive evidence that there was fraud in the Vene-
zuelan Presidential recall referendum. It shows that
there are important discrepancies between the offi-
cial results and the data obtained on the field during
referendum day.
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